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A Presidential Address, if I understand the genre, is an opportunity to make
bold claims without the ordinarily cooling prospect of a question period. While
it is a pleasure to be granted this freedom, I must confess some anxiety about
exercising it, an anxiety heightened by recollection of previous addresses, not
least last year’s tour de force from Charles Mills. Going further back, I am
haunted by the memory of a Presidential Address I heard 23 years ago in Pitts-
burgh, on a topic directly relevant to the one I have chosen today. In his address
to the 1996 meeting of the Central Division in Pittsburgh, Michael Friedman
launched a scathing attack on philosophical naturalism, where naturalism is
understood as the thesis that empirical knowledge is our only kind of knowl-
edge, and that ‘philosophy, as a discipline, is (. . . ) best understood as simply
one more part—perhaps a peculiarly abstract and general part—of empirical
natural science’ (Friedman, 1997, 7). Friedman drew on the history of physics
to develop a strong case for the idea that pure mathematics and philosophy
have sharply distinct structural roles in the development of human knowledge,
particularly at moments of ‘fundamental conceptual transformation’ such as the
early modern period, and the dawn of the twentieth century (1997, 18). At these
moments, Friedman argued, philosophy does not ‘proceed in splendid isolation’
from scientific developments, but somehow finds motivation from the course of
these developments, while operating at quite another level (1997, 18).
Notwithstanding the power of Friedman’s arguments, the question of how to
conceive of the relationship between philosophy and natural science—or how to
map their proper epistemic territories—remains somewhat unsettled, especially
in branches of philosophy and science far from the relatively clean structure of
physics. As an epistemologist, I am interested both in squarely philosophical
questions about the nature of knowledge itself, and in some messy empirical
questions about how knowledge is attributed, live and in real time, especially in
contexts of social interaction. Following Friedman, I am convinced that these
questions are not on the same level, but also that they cannot be investigated in
splendid isolation from each other: there is something of great epistemological
interest to be gained in studying the empirical details of what is happening in
ordinary knowledge attribution. These empirical details are studied in a great
range of different subdisciplines in psychology, linguistics, and sociology, and the
epistemologist who becomes curious about how knowledge is actually attributed
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will need to work hard even just to make sense of the disparate terminology and
methods of these disciplines. While clarifying terms and methods might help
one to summarize what is known empirically, such summaries will not on their
own answer core philosophical questions about knowledge, not least because
each of the relevant empirical disciplines brings heavy (and sometimes dubious)
philosophical presuppositions to its study of knowledge attribution. However, if
Friedman is right that philosophical progress can be motivated by the empirical
without being subsumed by it, then it should be possible for philosophers to
engage with empirical work on knowledge attribution in a suitably critical spirit.
If we do not see philosophy as subservient to science, our aim can be not simply
to uncover the philosophical commitments of the relevant empirical work, but
also to criticize these commitments and see this empirical work, and knowledge
itself, in a new light.
I take the expression ‘epistemic territory’ from the sociologist John Heritage,
whose work in conversational analysis will form my empirical point of departure
today. Conversational analysis studies verbal interactions of all types, including
phone calls to distress hotlines, televised news interviews, doctor-patient ex-
changes, courtroom cross-examinations, and casual gossip. Particular attention
is paid to aspects of interaction not commonly studied within traditional linguis-
tics, such as the timing of switches between speakers, the frequency and nature
of stumbles and repairs in speech, and the significance of interjections such as
‘oh’, ‘um’ and ‘uh’ (for an overview, see Sidnell & Stivers, 2012). Within con-
versational analysis, Heritage has been a pioneer in the subfield of ‘epistemics,’
which investigates the significance of what is known, and what is taken to be
known, by the various participants in a conversation. Philosophers may be more
accustomed to working with ideas from Grice (1975) or Stalnaker (2002) in this
general area; however, there is value in picking up a somewhat different, if often
overlapping, set of theoretical tools, and in exploring data that may be novel to
at least some of us.
As an example, we could start with the conversational particle ‘oh’, which
might at first seem to be an insignificant element in language. In his land-
mark 1984 article on this topic, Heritage observes that traditional linguists and
philosophers have had little to say about ‘oh’. He quotes Charles Carpenter
Fries, the author of The Structure of English, classifying it as a mere ‘signal of
continued attention’, and elsewhere as a ‘noncommunicative’ utterance (Fries,
1952, as quoted in Heritage, 1984, p. 337); on the side of philosophy, Wittgen-
stein is cited as remarking that ‘oh’ is well described simply as a sigh (Wittgen-
stein, 1974, 67, as quoted in Heritage 1984, 337).
Heritage argues that these authors have underestimated ‘oh’. Finding an
interesting set of patterns in its use, he contends that it functions as an epis-
temic change-of-state marker.1 Heritage’s original (1984) idea was that ordinary
conversational use of ‘oh’ is ‘used to propose that its producer has undergone
1There are a few other functions served by ‘o(h)’, such as the poetic vocative use inherited
from Greek and Latin; these are relatively rare in contemporary spoken English, and will be
set aside in what follows (for an overview of the full variety of functions of ‘o(h)’, see Heritage
2018).
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some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, informa-
tion, orientation or awareness’ (1984, 299). Subsequent elaboration makes it
clear that this change has a positive character, and in what follows I will argue
that ‘oh’ more specifically signals a moment of gaining knowledge, or regaining
awareness of stored knowledge. This is a strengthening of Heritage’s original
line: in describing what ‘oh’ signals, he gives weaker disjunctive formulations,
speaking of ‘knowledge or information’, rather than knowledge. I fear that in
doing so he is lumping together the situations which truly underpin the function
of this signal with situations in which the signal misfires. The tail flash of the
white-tailed deer signifies danger, not some disjunction of danger-or-apparent-
danger, even if in fact these animals suffer many false alarms. Suggesting that
the core function of ‘oh’ is to mark knowledge gain is a friendly amendment;
I hope to persuade you that this will actually be a better fit with Heritage’s
overall framework for understanding conversation, which is explicitly structured
in terms of knowledge. I trust it will also be clear how much I am indebted to
Timothy Williamson’s (2000) knowledge-first epistemology in trying to make
sense of this material.
In any event, the most striking use of ‘oh’ indicates surprise, or sudden and
unexpected knowledge acquisition, and this may be what first comes to mind
when we introspect on what it means, but most uses of ‘oh’ are more subdued.
The changes in epistemic state marked by ‘oh’ can come either from an ‘extra-
conversational contingency’ which is then taken up into talk (‘oh, that T-shirt
reminded me. . . ’), to mark something ‘sparked off’ or brought to awareness by
some feature of the conversation, or in response to being informed (‘oh, ok’). In
fact, sometimes what brought to current awareness is your own prior and inde-
pendent knowledge of the point that your interlocutor has just made, which is
why ‘oh, I know’ is such a strong form of agreement, above a generic agreement
marker like ‘yeah’ (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). When produced after the re-
sponse to a polar question, the ‘oh’ constitutes a kind of conversational receipt
for what one has learned, a crucial success signal in the joint action that con-
versational partners are cooperatively undertaking (Heritage, 1984, 304). We
will keep in mind that even if it functions as a signal of knowledge acquisition
or revival, ‘oh’ can be triggered by something which only seems to the producer
like knowledge, just as our use of other words (like ‘diamond’) can be triggered
by lookalikes. It is also possible to be duplicitous with this signal, strategically
presenting oneself as just now learning something one in fact knew all along.
When a conversational partner seems excited to inform you of something that
happens to be old news to you, rather than responding with ‘yeah’, and an elab-
oration which will make it clear that you are the more knowledgeable party on
this topic, you have the option of saving face for them with some ‘oh’-prefaced
assessment (‘oh dear’, ‘oh, wow’). The possibility of faking a na¨ıve position in
this manner is clearly parasitic on a general understanding of ‘oh’ as a marker
of a positive change of epistemic state. Although it plays an important role
in conversational dynamics, this tacit understanding is not necessarily available
to introspection, which does something to explain why Fries and Wittgenstein
could have advanced such dismissive explicit theories of ‘oh’.
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In my view, the norm to produce ‘oh’ as a knowledge acquisition marker is a
member of a special class of norms, the class that Sarah Murray and Will Starr
are describing when they write, ‘Many of the norms that govern our interac-
tions are not principles we would endorse if asked about. They are heuristics
of social cognition that we absorb from our social environment without being
explicitly formulated or taught’ (Murray & Starr, 2018, 218). They argue that
such norms ‘play a key and inadequately appreciated role in communication’,
enabling coordination among agents with conflicting aims (2018, 219). They
further argue that the coordinating function of communication between such
agents should lie at the core of any theory of what is happening in conversa-
tion. Narrower theories such as Grice’s are problematic, they argue: if you
are satisfied that communication is fundamentally about the mutual recogni-
tion of communicative intentions, you haven’t thought hard enough about what
could ever motivate perfectly rational Griceans with possibly conflicting aims
to express themselves, and get others to recognize their states of mind. Ac-
cording to Murray and Starr, norms like the Gricean maxims of Quantity and
Manner—and here I would add the norm to produce ‘oh’ on acquiring or re-
viving knowledge—are not followed because we are rational, but ‘because they
are part of our cultural inheritance’; such norms are ‘self-fulfilling expectations
about what agents like us [do] in particular circumstances’, ‘operating in the
shadows of our unconscious minds’ (Murray & Starr, 2018, 219).
I think Murray and Starr are absolutely right to focus on the ends served by
conversation, and to set themselves the task of explaining utterance force—what
is happening when we assert, question or command—in a way that will ‘show
that this is a stable and reproduced way of coordinating’ (Murray & Starr, 2018,
230). Their own theory argues that conversation should not be understood
in the self-contained terms of updating what we are mutually assuming for
the purposes of conversation, but as something that serves the function, and
has been selected to serve the function, of coordinating the real-world beliefs
and intentions of the interactants. As animals in the world, we can achieve
much more by working together in a coordinated fashion, and synchronization
of our intentions and beliefs in conversation could doubtless aid our joint action.
However, if we are going to think about structure of conversation as being
explained by its benefits, I wonder whether alignment of belief is the best we
can do. Some beliefs are better than others, and we might worry about the
desirability of a neutral drive towards alignment, in which we could all end up
running in perfect synchrony with each other, but out of line with the world,
like the proverbial lemmings off the cliff. So, I would like to pick up the spirit of
Murray and Starr’s approach, but try to experiment instead with the idea that
the epistemic side of human communication is fundamentally about achieving
coordination through the sharing of knowledge. (There is a motivational side
of communication as well, focused on coordination of desire or the pursuit of
the good, but I will be setting it aside in what follows.) Shared knowledge is
important because we ideally align not only with what other agents are thinking,
but also with states of the world.
Returning to our particle ‘oh’, given how much we learn about the world
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from talking to others, it is not surprising that we frequently acquire knowledge
during conversations. It remains an interesting question why we so frequently
broadcast this type of change, in the course of conversation, with an audible
expression.
Sociologists situate ‘oh’ in what they call the ‘epistemic backchannel’ of
conversation, along with a variety of other signals and devices. This channel
is heavily used: studies of spoken English conversation suggest that roughly
half of conversational turns are launched with ‘something besides a constituent
of a grammatical unit’—most commonly ‘yeah’ and ‘oh’ (Norrick, 2009, 871).
While these interjections initiate many utterances, they additionally occur in
medial positions and as free-standing conversational turns. Today I will be us-
ing English-language examples, but I should mention that there is a large body
of cross-linguistic work in this area. There are some points of deep similarity
across languages; for example, in the generic repair initiator ‘huh?’ which is
pronounced in very similar fashion globally (Dingemanse, Torreira, & Enfield,
2013). There are also interesting some points of difference: Finnish, for exam-
ple, has several distinct particles that divide the work done by ‘oh’ in English
(Koivisto, 2016). Notwithstanding these differences, it is widely understood that
some common functions are served by the epistemic backchannel, for speakers
of all languages. The backchannel, it will turn out, plays a key role in helping us
track our relative epistemic territories, where these territorial calculations are a
crucial determinant of what we are actually doing at any point in a conversation.
Looking at the history of conversational analysis, Heritage traces the the-
oretical development of the notion of ‘epistemic territory’ back to the 1970s
(Heritage, 2012b, 4), starting with an observation made by William Labov and
David Fanshel. They noted that asymmetries of knowledge sometimes have an
interesting impact on the structure of conversation. In particular, curious ef-
fects arise in discussion of events to which only one party to the conversation
has privileged access. In their terminology, where A and B are a conversational
dyad, A-events are those known to A but not B (or as we will later say, in A’s
territory and not B’s), and B-events are known to B but not A. (There are
several other types of events, but they will not concern us at present.) With
this distinction in hand, Labov and Fanshel formulate the following rule: ‘If A
makes a statement about B-events, then it is heard as a request for confirmation’
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977, 100). One way they tested this rule was in a series
of structured interviews with residents of New York, about their experiences
of life in the city. When any subject mentioned a burglary, the interviewer’s
script prompted them to say flatly, ‘And you never called the police.’ Even
with both declarative syntax and falling intonation, subjects all responded to
this ‘B-event’ statement as if it were a question (1977, 101).
The move of asking by declaring can be made in various ways. In her clas-
sic treatment of ‘fishing devices’, Anita Pomerantz distinguishes between two
grades of knowledge, the direct (or ‘type 1’) knowledge that one typically has
of one’s feelings, of events in which one was the ‘subject-actor’, and personal
data such as one’s name or marital status, and the indirect (or ‘type 2’) knowl-
edge that one has through inference and testimony, and through witnessing the
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actions of others from some distance. To fish, speakers can make declarative
statements expressing their type 2 knowledge to recipients with type 1 knowl-
edge of the same topics: Pomerantz’s examples include, ‘You were in Room 252
for a long time this afternoon,’ and ‘She said that uh you guys were having
a party Friday’ (Pomerantz, 1980). The speaker’s presentation of their lower
grade of knowledge is treated as an occasion for the recipient to elaborate on
this topic from their type 1 authoritative perspective. By fishing rather than
questioning more directly through interrogative syntax or intonation, Pomer-
antz argues, the speaker demonstrates some respect for the privacy or authority
of the more knowledgeable recipient who is spending unusual amounts of time
in room 252 or apparently planning a party.
In his account of the development of the theory of epistemic territory, the
last major figure that Heritage credits is the Japanese linguist Akio Kamio, who
introduced the concept of ‘territories of information’. Kamio replaces Pomer-
antz’s two grades of knowledge with a continuous gradient from 0 to 1, where
these numbers encode how deeply the topic is situated within one’s territory;
any given event can take any value on this line for each speaker and each hearer.
Speakers deploy different linguistic forms to signal their relative territorial pos-
session of a topic, relative both to the hearer(s) and to the upper and lower
bounds of the scale. This theory aims to explain, for example, the conditions
under which a speaker will say, ‘Summer in Alaska is beautiful’, as opposed to ‘I
hear summer in Alaska is beautiful.’ Japanese has particularly rich resources for
epistemic territorial marking, but Kamio argues that the same broad functions
are performed in different ways English-language conversations as well, with
subtle features of intonation contour playing a role in both languages along-
side more conspicuous evidential markings in enabling speakers to signal their
relative position at one point or another on the gradient (Kamio, 1995).
Heritage’s own theory of epistemic territory adopts the basic idea of the gra-
dient from Kamio, but with a qualitative rather than numerical scale, situating
speakers relative to each other on a spectrum between more knowledgeable (K+)
and less knowledgeable (K-) positions with respect to the topic at hand. Her-
itage distinguishes epistemic stance (what a speaker signals about their status,
at a given moment in conversation) from the underlying epistemic status itself.
As an example of how to stake out different stance positions on the gradient,
Heritage (2012b, 6) contrasts three different way a doctor might ask her patient
about his marital status, in the course of taking his medical history:
1. Are you married?
2. You’re married, aren’t you?
3. You’re married.
As utterances directed to someone presumed to have authoritative knowl-
edge—a person’s own marital status is squarely within his instinctively recog-
nized epistemic domain—these are all naturally heard as requests for informa-
tion, but the first, with its straight interrogative syntax, strikes a more deeply
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‘unknowing’ stance (a strong K-), in contrast to the second, where the tag ques-
tion requests confirmation, indicating that the speaker takes the positive answer
to be likely but not certain. The third strikes a milder still (K-) position, but
will still serve to motivate some reinforcement on the part of the addressee. Of
course, conversational participants can adopt an epistemic stance which differs
from their actual status, including hostile practices of deliberate deception, but
also innocent mistakes, and more constructive practices such as exam question-
ing; I will set these problem cases aside for the present with a promise to return
to them.
Heritage argues that in order to understand what social actions our con-
versational partners are engaged in, we invariably need ‘a fine-grained grasp of
epistemic domains and relative epistemic status within them.’ The question of
whether another person is reminding you of something or asking you something,
for example, cannot be resolved simply by whether this person is using inter-
rogative syntax: with that syntax, you still need some grasp of the speaker’s
epistemic domain in order to tell the difference between a rhetorical question
and a genuine question. Without that syntax, as in the ‘You’re married’ ex-
ample, a speaker might still be requesting information: indeed, a recent corpus
study of information requests in English found that only a quarter of them were
marked with wh- question words, only half of declarative questions had strongly
rising intonation, and many had falling intonation (Stivers, 2010). Meanwhile,
declarative syntax might or might not be heard as making an assertion, with
rising intonation inherently ambiguous between questioning and continuing, and
assigned to one of these categories in part by calculation of epistemic status.
The chronic need for calculation of epistemic status is very closely linked to
what Heritage sees as one of the fundamental purposes of conversation, which is
to pool the knowledge of the participants. Here is a core principle that supports
the pooling of knowledge: whatever a speaker’s actual epistemic status might be
on a given point, she can motivate conversation by taking an epistemic stance
that contrasts her (presumed) epistemic position with that of her audience.
There are two possibilities:
First, speakers can position themselves in a relatively unknowing
(or K-) position relative to others concerning the matter at hand,
thereby initiating sequences by inviting or eliciting information from
a projectedly more knowing (or K+) recipient. Alternatively, know-
ing (K+) speakers can simply initiate talk concerning the matter at
hand, thus launching a sequence, finding a warrant for this conduct
by projecting their recipients to be in a relatively unknowing (K-)
position. (Heritage, 2012a, 33)
K- initiations prompt replies. There a cooperative norm of answering questions,
and this norm meets strong compliance in practice, with one recent study find-
ing fewer than 5 percent of conversational questions going unanswered (Stivers,
2010), or fewer still if we include not only direct but also ‘transformative’ an-
swers, which for example correct a mistaken presupposition (Stivers & Hayashi,
2010). K+ initiations also prompt interaction: the story-teller seeks receipts
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and assessments (‘oh my goodness’) from his audience, and will struggle, repeat
and refine his contribution if he does not find it (Bavelas, Coates, & John-
son, 2000). The dynamic here is subtle, because either type of initiation can
prompt the addressee to reject the status projected upon them, for example,
by responding to a K+ initiation with ‘yeah’, and an elaboration, reversing the
presumed epistemic gradient by replying with more details of what has just been
presented by the other party as news. But whether the epistemic stances taken
are accepted or challenged, disparities in perceived status function as the ‘hy-
draulic’ engine of conversation: ‘any turn that formulates a K+/K- imbalance
between participants will warrant the production of talk that redresses the im-
balance’; Heritage maintains that either type of gradient will start ‘an epistemic
seesaw motion that will tend to drive interactional sequences until a claim of
equilibrium-for-all-practical-purposes is registered by the person who had pre-
viously assumed (or was assumed to be) the K- position’ (Heritage, 2012a, 49).
(Note the asymmetry here: it is the apparently K- person who must be satisfied
that equilibrium has been reached, a point that will matter when I turn to dis-
cuss skepticism.) This satisfaction can be registered in various ways, down to a
simple nod or, ‘oh, ok’. Standing cooperative norms of conversation give us the
sense that something is wrong if a question is left hanging, unanswered, or a
reply (or story) is left unacknowledged. In summation, Heritage writes, ‘giving
and receiving information are normative warrants for talking, are monitored
accordingly, and are kept track of minutely and publicly. It could, in principle,
be different, but it is not’ (Heritage, 2012a, 49).
Even if it is essential to meaningful communication that there is some flow
of information between the parties, this flow could in principle exist without
the running commentary on how it is going; in fact, for all nonhuman animal
species, as far as I know, this is how it works. Other animals certainly share
knowledge, alerting each other to everything from nectar sources to predators,
but they do so without monitoring or broadcasting a public record of the shifting
epistemic gradient between them. Other animals have superficially interactive
duets and contact calling bouts, but not genuinely interactive conversations,
where contributions are elicited and questioned, repair signals are sent if some-
thing is not quite heard, corrections are given, and confirmations or receipts are
issued for successful transmission (Enfield, 2017, ch. 3, 9). The representation
of epistemic gradient enables human beings to take an active part in managing
the flow of information between them, for better and for worse. Representa-
tions of epistemic gradients enable correction and cooperation, but also tactical
deception, an arena where humans vastly outperform other animals (Martin &
Santos, 2014).
It is time to distinguish the better and worse cases. Note that if any rep-
resented epistemic gradient between speaker and audience motivates talk, then
there are two satisfactory stopping points: both parties can move up to a shared
K+ position or down to a shared K- position. As soon as we are in a position
where both of us take ourselves to know the relevant fact, or a position where
both of us agree that we are ignorant, then it is clear that there is nothing
more to be gained by sharing what we take ourselves to know on this point in
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conversation (although the position of recognizing our mutual ignorance could
motivate other actions, such as efforts at inquiry and inference). Conversation
can improve our epistemic position through either type of levelling: most ob-
viously, when we move up to shared knowledge, but also when a speaker who
had mistakenly taken herself to be in a K+ situation is corrected by a hearer,
and, assuming that the hearer lacks knowledge on this point, both parties level
down to a K- stance that accurately reflects their lack of knowledge.
Conversational levelling is not always a good thing, epistemically: where
stance departs from status, we can worsen our status by aligning our stances.
When people who are actually ignorant present themselves as knowledgeable, we
can worsen our epistemic position by moving to accept what they say; or, if we
start out knowing and are inappropriately challenged, we can lose knowledge
by levelling down, which is presumably what’s happening when we meet the
gaslighter and the skeptic (more on them later).
If conversation is motivated by representations of epistemic gradients, then
conversation’s capacity to improve our epistemic position depends on the quality
of those representations. We need some ability to gauge what others will know,
especially in cases where their presumed knowledge differs from our own. One
might expect the calculation of relative epistemic status to be computationally
intractable, or at least extremely difficult in the ordinary course of conversation,
but Heritage contends that we generally seem to solve this problem in real time:
‘While it may be thought that the notion of epistemic territory introduces a
contingency of daunting difficulty and complexity into the study of interaction,
in fact relative access to particular epistemic domains is treated as a more or less
settled matter in the large bulk of ordinary interaction’ (Heritage, 2012b, 6).
He suggests that this apparent general agreement on relative epistemic status is
enabled in large measure by common fixed habits of territorial recognition, for
example, expecting individuals to know more than outsiders about their own
thoughts, plans, feelings, friends, jobs, pets, and families (ibid.), and to follow
some common rules about the adjudication of evidence types and territorial
disputes (Heritage & Raymond, 2005).
Indeed, it is possible to trace the core of our initial recognition of epistemic
territory much further back, to the mechanisms for tracking gaze and perspective
that we share with nonhuman primates, mechanisms which give us an immediate
sense of what lies within another creature’s field of view, and what is hidden
from them (Bra¨uer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). The possession of epistemic
territory is not exclusive—for example, we can share visual access to what lies
within our common field of view—but it is nevertheless helpful to track the
different boundaries of privately held epistemic territory. In strategic games,
apes and monkeys remember whether competitors do or do not know where
food has been hidden: they selectively take advantage of ignorant competitors
(Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, & Santos,
2011) and make appropriate inferences from the choices of competitors who they
recognize as being in an epistemic position superior to their own (Kaminski,
Call, & Tomasello, 2008). Mindreading has clear payoffs in anticipating the
actions of competing animals over time, and in using those other animals’ signs
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of epistemic access as a guide to parts of the world that they cannot directly
see for themselves.
I stress competition here, because nonhuman primates are surprisingly weak
at tracking mental states in cooperative contexts. In a friendly situation where
trainers are pointing out the location of hidden food, chimpanzees fail to dis-
tinguish knowledgeable from ignorant helpers (Povinelli, Rulf, & Bierschwale,
1994), despite the fact that they can draw these distinctions for similar rewards
when competing (Kaminski et al., 2008). Mindreading capacities in competi-
tive contexts are now well-established in experiments that aim to control for
shallower explanations such as reading another animal’s outward behavior as a
guide to action. Something deeper is already happening in primate recognition
of epistemic territory.
Specifically human tracking of epistemic territory runs deeper still, because
we track not only what lies in or out of the epistemic territory of others as
compared to ourselves, but we also track how well they are tracking our territo-
rial recognition. One of the defining features of human social intelligence is our
capacity for joint attention, in which subjects attend to the same object in the
awareness that this attention is socially shared. Other primates will often align
on the same object, for example by following sightlines; only humans deliber-
ately engage the eyes of another to direct attention onto an object, and look
back at each other to check our mutual alignment. Human beings deploy their
social intelligence not just in competing with each other, but also in cooperat-
ing. Michael Tomasello observes that this fact decisively changes the value of
outward evidence of our mental states: human beings have much richer social
intelligence because, in our capacity as cooperators, we need to broadcast those
states. He puts the point as follows: ‘Whereas during competition individu-
als read the minds of their competitors against the competitor’s will (when we
are competing, I want to conceal my mental states from you), in cooperation
and coordination individuals want their partner to read their minds (when we
are cooperating and coordinating, I do everything I can to display or advertise
my mental states to you to facilitate the process)’ (Tomasello, 2018, 7). These
advertisements are enabled in a number of ways, starting with anatomical dif-
ferences between us and our closest animal relatives. We have evolved the most
‘readable’ eyes of any primate, with our contrasting white sclera and elongated
eye shape making it exceptionally easy to see which way a human is looking,
even at a distance (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001). Broadcast of epistemic states
then continues up into conversational epistemic signals like ‘oh’.
These devices help us to calculate shifting epistemic territory in live con-
versation, enabling the social division of epistemic labour. Communal pooling
of knowledge would be hampered both by widespread distrust and by complete
credulity, so it makes sense that generally cooperative creatures like us instinc-
tively attribute knowledge to each other concerning our local expert domains
of our experiences, plans, pets, families and so on. However, these instincts of
ours generate some initial difficulties we need to tackle, even before we tackle
problems arising from rogue speakers who defect from the generally cooperative
system to engage in deception.
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Differences can arise between a sincere person’s actual epistemic territory
(more simply, their knowledge) and their perceived epistemic territory (defin-
able in terms of the set of questions whose answers the relevant audience will
take on trust from this speaker, instinctively seeing the speaker as knowing).
Sincere speakers can make innocent mistakes about their own plans and pets,
and they can know—and want to communicate—things that go well beyond the
safe zone of what other people will instinctively see them as knowing. I take
the first kind of problem to be structurally similar to the problem we already
have as individuals with fallible sensory systems: trusting an innocently mis-
taken speaker is not so different from trusting one’s innocently mistaken eyes.
As for the second kind of problem, if a speaker wants to communicate some
knowledge which her audience will not simply take on trust, she can turn to ex-
plicit argument, and she can do this even if what she knows was not originally
formed on the basis of an argument. Much of what we know is unreflective, not
formed on the basis of prior sequential consideration of evidence; but even un-
reflective perceptual judgments—for example, reports of having seen something
surprising—can be defended argumentatively upon challenge.
My understanding of argument is partly shaped by the theory that Hugo
Mercier and Dan Sperber have been advocating in their recent work, in which
explicit reasoning has evolved as a solution to our cheap signalling problem
(Mercier & Sperber, 2017). Unlike bees, who can only communicate an innately
restricted set of facts about nectar source quantity, distance and direction, or
peacocks, who can send the message that they are fit only by maintaining ex-
tremely costly plumage, we can send a signal saying almost anything at virtually
no cost. But unless our signals are credible, there is no value in transmitting
(or receiving) them. Mercier and Sperber argue that speakers and hearers who
have the same instincts about what argument forms are valid can exploit those
shared instincts to their mutual advantage (and they also produce extensive em-
pirical evidence that even without any training, humans have strong instinctive
capacities for logical reasoning, but these are optimized only in argumentative
contexts). If speakers can show that their claims follow from premises already
accepted by the hearers, or premises that will be accepted on trust, they can
radically extend the scope of what they can successfully communicate (Mercier
& Sperber, 2017). Like Murray and Starr, however, Mercier and Sperber focus
on the value of belief coordination, or more precisely, on the value for a speaker
of persuading the audience to accept what she believes, where this belief might
or might not be true. Without denying that reason can be used to persuade
someone of something falling short of knowledge, the existence of reasoning in
our species would be better explained by its contribution to the expansion of
shared knowledge, as opposed to shared belief. If the presence of reasoning
in our species is to be explained by its advantages, the advantages of shared
knowledge for both parties to communication are much more striking than the
advantages of synchronized belief. Furthermore, mere belief synchrony might
be achieved by devices much simpler than argument, such as deferral to the
dominant animal.
Initial calculations of epistemic territory can guide me in deciding whether to
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simply tell you something or work at persuading you, although I can also switch
to argumentation when my effort at telling fails to secure uptake. My subsequent
choice of premises is all about territorial calculation: I need to think about what
you will know, and what you will take my word for. We think of argumentation
in terms of territorial capture. Reasoning soundly from known premises can
expand our jointly held actual epistemic territory, if you recognize my initial
territory and follow my argument. Alternatively, I could engage in sophistry
and reason on the basis of what I have calculated you will falsely perceive me
as knowing, even to conclusions I know to be false, but there are risks in taking
that path. If I need you to fool you with something that is going to look like
knowledge, I am going to have to keep track of the lies I have told you to ensure
their consistency, and to the extent that maximizing knowledge is the prosocial
thing to do, I should fear the discovery of my campaign of deception, and your
subsequent classification of me as a malevolent actor, which will be a problem
if I want you to take my word for anything in the future, even on a matter well
within the territory you would ordinarily assign to me instinctively (Cle´ment,
2010; Sperber et al., 2010). If I try to expand my perceived epistemic territory
illegitimately, through sophistry, and I am caught, I can end up shrinking my
socially acknowledged territory below its original starting point.
The reduction of recognized territory is not always a bad thing. Unlike the
white-tailed deer who are automatically startled into flight by every white flash,
we have some flexible choice about the K+ initiations we hear from others, even
when they are speaking of matters clearly within the territory we would ordi-
narily instinctively grant them. I might know that there’s something strangely
tricky about that thing that looks like a cup of water, right in your line of sight,
and might thus be able to correct your false presupposition as you are about
to drink from it. In these cases, cooperative groups can outperform isolated
individuals in gaining knowledge, through a socially distributed safety network;
we can to some extent cover each other’s generally recognized territory, saving
each other from cases in which we had only the appearance of knowledge, and
not the real thing.
However, there are also cases of hostile reduction in perceived territory. The
gaslighter gets into the evil business of (for example) denying our knowledge of
states of affairs we have experienced (Abramson, 2014). To the extent that we
can recognize their malevolent agenda—the people who assaulted you clearly
have something to gain in denying your claims to know what happened—we
can sometimes find a way of resisting gaslighters’ efforts to ‘tell us what really
happened’, their misrepresentation of the epistemic gradient (although I would
not want to underestimate the power of another person’s expressed doubts in
making one begin to doubt oneself).
We turn now to skepticism. It may seem strange that I am dwelling on the
cooperative mechanisms of oral conversation in laying the groundwork for my
explanation of what is going wrong with us in philosophical skepticism. Surely
Descartes confronted an admirably strong form of the skeptical problem while
thinking in silence and isolation, in his stove-heated room. But it is striking
that even Descartes creates the character of the evil genius to personify the
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skeptical problem; he imagines fetching lines of dialogue for this character. It
seems to me vastly easier to motivate skepticism by imagining being confronted
by questions, following an effort to make some assertion about the world, rather
than attempting to (for example) construct a pure monologue aimed at deriving
the result that no one knows anything from some first principles about the nature
of knowledge. Efforts in that latter direction seem to me more likely to raise
doubts about those principles than to raise confidence in the conclusion of the
attempted derivation.
In real (and imagined) conversations, the skeptic does something unusual,
and apparently disinterested. If we have a cooperative system of gradient lev-
elling, which generally functions to maximize knowledge among prosocial and
largely epistemically competent creatures who can be assumed to want knowl-
edge, the skeptic perversely chooses to run it in the opposite direction, as if his
desire were to minimize knowledge. He exploits our usual cooperative conver-
sational mechanisms throughout: if I start by claiming for example that there
is water in this glass, he does not simply disregard this claim, or declare that
knowledge is always impossible. The skeptic gets under my skin by granting
me some patch of uncontested epistemic territory: for example, he grants that
I know how things visually appear to me. That is a premise the skeptic can
choose to take on trust, and it seems relevant to my original claim about this
being a glass of water, so it could in principle work as the foundation of some
argument we could pursue together. He is not just shutting down conversation
in a way that would let us step out of the seesaw: we feel the usual hydraulic
pull of the epistemic engine. The skeptic then poses the question of whether
what seems to me to be water might not be another, visually indistinguishable
liquid. By adopting this K- stance on the question of whether there is water
in the glass, the skeptic has control of the conversation: his position will moti-
vate further conversational exchanges until he grants that equilibrium has been
reached. We recall the asymmetry of sequence completion: it is the person who
had taken the K- position who must be satisfied.
Meanwhile, through his active line of questioning, the skeptic has also put
me in a new frame of mind about the contents of the glass. In normal circum-
stances, I could have made the unreflective judgment that it contained water,
and a normal interlocutor, sharing visual access to this scene and to my line
of sight, would readily have made the same unreflective judgment and credited
both of us with shared knowledge. When the skeptic refuses to grant my cus-
tomary epistemic territory, I am stuck trying in vain to get us together into a
K+ position, while restricted to using arguments that start from premises my
conversational partner will accept as known. My ensuing failure of argument
can start to feel like a failure of knowledge, not least because one generally good
sign that something is known, that it actually falls in my territory, is that others
are recognizing my territorial claim to it. It is in general a good feature of our
cooperative knowledge-gaining system that we respect the rights of others to
challenge our epistemic standing, not least because it is rarely in anyone’s inter-
est to refuse to take our knowledge on board, setting aside malevolent characters
like the gaslighter and the coal-funded climate change denier.
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Far from appearing as malevolent, the pure skeptic can come across as
straightforwardly impractical, in a way that seems to radiate philosophical pu-
rity. He can even present himself as in an odd way pro-socially committed to a
deep and very important project, the investigation of the nature of knowledge
itself. If I am right, then the skeptic does actually bring to light an interest-
ing feature of how knowledge is instinctively defended under pressure, but his
methods of relentless questioning are not well designed to uncover the larger
nature of what knowledge actually is. The skeptic is missing something impor-
tant about how epistemic territory is initially gained and instinctively granted,
even though he himself has to dole out these grants at least about appearances
in order to keep the conversation going (and with his insatiable questions, he’s
a genius at keeping the conversation going). He is playing us, at a game we are
instinctively driven to play, but as philosophers, we can step back and take a
larger perspective on this whole game.
Today I have made some bold and under-argued claims that the natural
function of human conversation is to share knowledge, rather than just to syn-
chronize beliefs. It is tempting to end on a jolly note, praising the conversations
we have as humans with each other, especially those at the APA, at the recep-
tion we are about to enjoy. But my parting words are going to take us in quite
another direction. If we have a cognitive and cultural system whose natural
function is to share knowledge, this does not guarantee that we will end up
sharing knowledge. The unconscious drives supporting our epistemic trust and
vigilance evolved in small-scale societies, where judgments were typically based
on first-hand experience, and testimony was delivered face to face. We are now
immersed in a complex media environment whose algorithm-driven dynamics
are barely understood even by those who created it. We are like white-tailed
deer who have wandered into a forest full of loudspeakers broadcasting startling
noises and hunters who can spot us better every time we flash our tails, clicking
on one reaction symbol or another. The same instincts which support knowledge
gain in some environments could in other environments turn us into hostile and
polarized teams of lemmings, increasingly detached from each other, and from
reality. If we had some deeper epistemic self-understanding, we could perhaps
do more to protect ourselves, as a species, from the new forms of epistemic
pollution that are emerging globally. Just as learning to represent epistemic
gradients opened up new possibilities for active knowledge sharing (and for de-
liberate deception), so also, moving up a level and learning to represent how we
represent epistemic gradients also opens up new possibilities, both to protect
our pursuit of knowledge and to threaten it like never before. I think it is an
open question whether philosophers motivated to defend the pursuit of knowl-
edge will develop the kind of epistemic self-understanding we need, in time to
save our species. As President, I declare a state of emergency.
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